

## Message Text

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14

ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W

----- 130138

O R 060531Z SEP 76

FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9277

INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE

AMEMBASSY MANILA

AMEMBASSY BANGKOK

AMEMBASSY JAKARTA

AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR

AMEMBASSY TOKYO

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USMISSION NATO BRUSSELS

AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE

AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 7044

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR UNGA KS KN

SUBJ: DEFERRAL OF KOREAN ITEM AT 31ST UNGA

REF: STATE 219341

BEGIN SUMMARY: EMBASSY DISCUSSED DEFERRAL WITH MOFA. THEIR PRELIMINARY REACTION, SUBJECT TO CONSULTATION WITH FOREIGN MINISTER, IS THAT GENERAL COMMITTEE COMPOSITION IS VERY FAVORABLE FOR US, THAT WE ARE UNLIKELY TO KNOW MUCH MORE ABOUT HOW PLENARY WILL VOTE AFTER ASKING ASEAN TO TAKE SOUNDINGS THAN WE KNOW NOW, THAT TIME IS ALREADY CRITICALLY SHORT, AND THAT WE SHOULD, ON BASIS OF FAVORABLE GENERAL COMMITTEE OUTLOOK, TAKE THE RISK AND GO FOR DEFERRAL. MOFA WANTS TO TAKE PRELIMINARY SOUNDINGS WITH INDONESIANS AND MALAYSIANS DIRECTLY BECAUSE OF TIME FACTOR. END SUMMARY.

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1. EMBOFF DISCUSSED ALL POINTS COVERED REFTEL WITH MOFA IO BUREAU DIRECTOR CHUNG U-YONG AND UN DIV CHIEF YI CHONG-BIN. BOTH WERE PRIMARILY CONCERNED ABOUT SHORTNESS OF TIME BEFORE DEFERRAL MUST BE VOTED ON IN GENERAL COMMITTEE AND UNGA PLENARY (SEPTEMBER 22-24 AND SEPTEMBER 27-28 RESPECTIVELY) AND ABOUT TIME-CONSUMING PROCESS OF GETTING FIRST FRANCE AND THEN ASEAN INTO GEAR SUGGESTED PARA 7 REFTEL. YI AND CHUNG AGREED THAT GENERAL COMMITTEE COMPOSITION WAS DEFINITELY FAVORABLE COMPARED TO PREVIOUS YEARS. MOST OF CONVERSATION CONCENTRATED ON PLENARY. BOTH OFFICIALS WARNED AGAINST EXPECTING TOO MUCH FROM ASEAN, POINTING OUT THAT THEY HAVE NEVER HAD ORGANIZED INFLUENCE IN UN. WHILE AGREEING THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO GIVE IMPRESSION THAT DEFERRAL IDEA WAS BRAIN CHILD OF NATIONS NOT IDENTIFIED WITH EITHER SIDE, THEY NOTED THAT IF LOBBYING PERIOD WAS GOING TO BE SHORT, CORE GROUP, RATHER THAN ASEAN, WAS MUCH BETTER ORGANIZED TO MAKE WIDE RANGE OF CONTACTS NECESSARY FOR SUCCESS IN PLENARY. THEY AGREED, HOWEVER, THAT INITIAL APPROACHES SHOULD BE MADE THROUGH FRANCE, AUSTRALIA AND ASEAN.

2. CHUNG SAID HE DID NOT THINK FAILURE TO WIN ON DEFERRAL IN PLENARY WOULD AFFECT LATER FIRST COMMITTEE OR PLENARY VOTE ON RESOLUTIONS THEMSELVES BECAUSE THERE WOULD PROBABLY BE A SIGNIFICANT INTERVAL AFTER THE DEFERRAL VOTE TO PERMIT ACTIVE LOBBYING BY THE CORE GROUP, DURING WHICH TIME THE PROCEDURAL VOTE ON DEFERRAL WOULD HAVE BEEN LARGELY FORGOTTEN. HE THOUGHT, HOWEVER, THAT A SUCCESS IN THE GENERAL COMMITTEE WOULD DEFINITELY INFLUENCE VOTES IN OUR FAVOR IN THE PLENARY, WHICH WOULD TEND TO INCLINE NATURALLY TOWARD SUPPORTING THE GENERAL COMMITTEE VOTE. BOTH YI AND CHUNG AGREED THAT IF GENERAL COMMITTEE VOTED FOR DEFERRAL, SENTIMENT FOR DEFERRAL OF KOREAN DEBATE WAS LIKELY TO BE STRONGER THAN FEELING THAT KOREA WAS IMPORTANT ISSUE WHICH SHOULD BE DEBATED BECAUSE IT HAD PLACED ON AGENDA ACCORDING TO PROPER PROCEDURES. CHUNG ALSO AGREED THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO AVOID HAVING SC DISCUSSION OF NAMIBIA QUESTION TAKE PLACE AT SAME TIME AS VOTES ON DEFERRAL.

3. CHUNG AGREED THAT LOBBYING FOR DEFERRAL SHOULD BEGIN AS LATE AS POSSIBLE AND THAT PREPARATIONS, ALTHOUGH THEY SHOULD BE THOROUGH AND PURSUED WITH DISPATCH, SHOULD BE KEPT SECRET FROM NORTH KOREA'S SUPPORTERS UNTIL WE WERE READY TO ACT.  
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BOTH AGREED THAT SHORT LOBBYING PERIOD WOULD, IF INITIATIVE CAUGHT NORTH KOREA'S SUPPORTERS OFF GUARD, WORK TO OUR ADVANTAGE. CHUNG ALSO THOUGHT THAT LOBBYING COULD BE CONCENTRATED IN NEW YORK, WITH SUPPLEMENTAL EFFORT IN CAPITALS, SINCE MOST FOREIGN MINISTERS WOULD BE AT UN AND WOULD BE ABLE TO MAKE DECISION ON PROCEDURAL QUESTION SUCH AS DEFERRAL WITHOUT REFERENCE TO CAPITAL FOR APPROVAL.

4. CHUNG SAID HE WOULD CONSULT WITH FOREIGN MINISTER AND THAT MOFA WOULD PROVIDE FORMAL VIEWS SOONEST. HE ASKED, HOWEVER, THAT EMBASSY REPORT THIS PRELIMINARY CONVERSATION AND SUBSEQUENTLY SAID THAT HE WAS THINKING OF CONTACTING INDONESIA AND MALAYSIA DIRECTLY (BUT IN A WAY WHICH WOULD NOT COMPROMISE DEFERRAL INITIATIVE TO NORTH KOREAN SUPPORTERS) TO TEST THEIR REACTION TO DEFERRAL INITIATIVE. CHUNG SAYS HE HAS ESTABLISHED CHANNEL WHICH HAS PROVED RELIABLE AND CONFIDENTIAL IN PAST. HE ASKED EMBASSY'S REACTION TO THIS IDEA. WE DISCOURAGED IDEA, RESPONDING THAT WHILE WE UNDERSTOOD DESIRE TO GET EARLY FIRST HAND ASSESSMENT OF ASEAN ATTITUDES RATHER THAN RELYING ON FRANCE TO PASS THE WORD, WE THOUGHT IT BEST TO COORDINATE WITH WASHINGTON FIRST.

5. CHUNG LATER CALLED TO SAY THAT HE HAD DISCUSSED SUBJECT WITH FOREIGN MINISTER WHO "GENERALLY AGREED" WITH LINE TAKEN BY CHUNG AND YI ABOVE. CHUNG DECLINED TO FURTHER CHARACTERIZE FORMIN'S REACTION, NOTING ONLY THAT MINISTER WOULD CONVEY VIEWS TO AMBASSADOR AT NEXT MEETING.

6. ACTION REQUESTED: WOULD APPRECIATE IMMEDIATE RESPONSE FROM DEPARTMENT ON CHUNG'S DESIRE TO TAKE DISCREET DIRECT SOUNDINGS WITH JAKARTA AND KL.

6. COMMENT: CHUNG WAS AS CONFIDENT AND APPARENTLY READY TO JOIN BATTLE WITH THE NORTH KOREANS IN THE UNGA AS WE HAVE EVER SEEN HIM. FOREIGN MINISTER'S APPROACH MAY BE MORE RESTRAINED, BUT CHUNG, JUDGING FROM HIS DEMEANOR IN THIS CONVERSATION, APPEARS TO BELIEVE OUR POSITION ON DEFERRAL IS STRONG, AND IS READY TO HIT THE NORTH KOREANS AND THEIR SUPPORTERS WITH ALL WE'VE GOT. END COMMENT.  
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